What does Asia want from COP 31?
Sophie Ibbotson is Uzbekistan’s Ambassador for Ecology and the former Chairman of the RSAA. As a DPhil student at Oxford University, she is researching water security and climate change in Central Asia
Nowhere on Earth is safe from the impact of climate change – it does not recognise international borders – but in parts of Asia the combination of increasingly extreme climatic conditions, flooding and drought, overstretched infrastructure and state budgets, environmental damage, and, in some places, high population density makes communities particularly vulnerable. From 9-20 November, representatives of almost 200 countries, including an estimated 77 heads of state, will be in Antalya, Türkiye to participate in the 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, better known as COP 31. It is the third time in the past four years that the event has taken place in Asia – Baku, Azerbaijan was the host city in 2024, and Dubai, UAE in 2023 – perhaps an indication of the seriousness with which Asian nations are facing up to collective challenges.
In advance of COP 31, multiple Asian governments have published their negotiating priorities; others can be assumed or extrapolated from recent statements and press releases. Three key pillars or themes are repeated across the continent:
Collective action
China – the world’s largest emitter of CO21 but also the largest investor and producer in renewable energy2 – will be the most influential state at COP 31 following the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) earlier this year. Deputy Minister of Ecology and Environment Li Gao, who is leading the Chinese delegation, has stated pointedly that China opposes unilateralism and protectionism, and there is a common responsibility to uphold both the UNFCCC and the commitments of the Paris Agreement.
At the other end of the scale, tiny Mauritius (population circa 1.25 million) is building collective solidarity with other vulnerable small island developing states (SIDS), including those in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. Mauritian President Dharam Gokhool has emphasised the need for SIDS to strengthen their common voice to amplify their influence in international climate negotiations, in particular those relating to emissions and the 1.5°C global warming limit.
SIDS will not be the only conference sub-group working collectively at COP 31. Uzbekistan’s Aziz Abdukhakimov, Presidential Adviser on Environmental Issues and Chair of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, is prioritising his country’s cooperation with the Mountain Group and the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs). These two groups acknowledge the intersection of geographical and climate challenges.
Climate adaptation
The mitigation and reversal of climate change would be the ideal, but most of the Asian parties at COP 31 take a realistic position, acknowledging that adaptation – coping with and reducing the impacts of a changing climate – must be a central part of every country’s climate strategy. Climate adaptation is particularly important for Central Asia, where rising temperatures, water scarcity, glacier retreat, drought and land degradation are increasingly affecting economic development and people’s livelihoods. Uzbekistan will be hosting a side event Bridging the Adaptation Gap: Water and Climate Resilience in Central Asia at their national pavilion.
Both Türkiye and Pakistan will be highlighting the importance of climate-resilient agriculture. Pakistan’s National Adaptation Plan (NAP) names adaptation as the central pillar of the country’s climate response. Pakistan will be working with international partners to keep the implementation of the Baku Adaptation Road Map on the COP 31 agenda; and to raise awareness of the finance, technology and capacity gaps which limit developing countries’ ability to implement the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) framework. Saad Ahmad, First Secretary at Pakistan’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, is adamant that ‘Climate-vulnerable populations must not be left to bear the consequences of a crisis they did little to create’3, and that developing countries cannot be expected to pursue climate objectives at the expense of poverty alleviation, energy access and economic growth.
Climate finance
Another recurrent theme is the need to mobilise affordable (which for some states has to mean debt-free) climate finance. The funding gap is stark – according to the OECD, developed nations currently mobilise around $137 billion annually; but India’s estimated need alone is $170 billion per year. When the Eighth Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly was held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in June 2026, a $3.9 billion replenishment package (GEF-9) was approved and pledged, but it is a drop in the ocean compared to what is needed.
COP 29 host Azerbaijan is keen to see that the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), signed in Baku in 2024, is not just a target on paper. The Azeri delegation’s pitch is that NCQG is more than a financial objective: it is a test of the effectiveness and credibility of the Paris Agreement.
In Türkiye, COP 31’s flagship initiative is the Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE), under which beneficiaries will receive support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to translate national climate priorities into investment-ready projects and facilitate access to international financing. The buzz word is ‘bankability’. Three of the first five pilot countries – Indonesia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan – are in Asia, and COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum describes it as ‘a practical mechanism for closing the implementation gap.’
Is there one single negotiating strategy for Asia at COP 31? No. But there are a number of shared priorities and a general commitment that multilateralism is the only way to progress. Abdukhakimov’s final message going into COP 31 is clear: ‘The climate challenges facing Asia are interconnected, and our responses must be equally coordinated. Through regional solidarity, stronger international partnerships and collective action, we can turn shared challenges into opportunities for sustainable development and a more resilient future.’
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.
