Trump and Iran: Between Nuclear Compromise and Military Conflict

Amin Saikal is Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies at the Australian National University, Adjunct Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

President Donald Trump’s gunboat diplomacy has put Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a difficult predicament: either to make a nuclear deal that suits the US and its most important regional ally, Israel, or bear responsibility for an American military operation to destroy Iran’s nuclear and military capability. He is likely to opt for an ijtihadi (pragmatic) rather than jihadi (combative) response, allowing the necessary compromises to be made for a deal.

At a gathering of the faithful in mid-April, Khamenei said he was neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic about the indirect nuclear talks. He has indicated that negotiating a deal was one of the tasks of the Iranian foreign ministry. Although he distanced himself from the outcome of the negotiations, he knows that the final decision rests with him.

This is not the first time that the Supreme Leader has been confronted with a very difficult challenge. He has experienced many on both domestic and foreign policy fronts over the nearly four decades of his rule. Prominent among them was negotiating the July 2015 landmark multilateral ‘Iran nuclear agreement’ (officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), from which Trump withdrew the US unilaterally in May 2018, to the chagrin of other signatories (Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China).

Despite being highly distrustful of the US as a ‘hegemonic’ power, with ill intentions towards his Islamic regime, Khamenei fully backed the negotiations resulting in the JCPOA. In this, he prioritised pragmatic instincts over ideological considerations in enacting what he called ‘heroic flexibility’. Nothing has been more imperative to him than to ensure the survival and continuity of the Islamic regime that he inherited from its founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-1989). He can be expected to do the same this time, in return for, in the words of foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, a ‘fair and honourable deal’.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly stressed the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, citing as evidence its signing of the JCPOA, Iran’s membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Khamenei’s declaration of nuclear weapons as ‘unIslamic’. The JCPOA limited Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3.67% purity for civilian use, in return for lifting US-led sanctions. The regime has been stung by the US failure to meet its end of the bargain by abrogating the nuclear agreement and refusing to remove all of the sanctions, including Iran’s disconnection from the SWIFT international banking system. Washington’s linking of the nuclear issue to a demand that Iran should dismantle its missile capability and regional influence have caused serious consternation in Tehran.

Since the US exited from the JCPOA, under the ‘snapback’ clause of that agreement, Tehran has accelerated its nuclear program, installing more advanced centrifuges and enriching uranium up to 60% purity, just below a weapons-grade level. Senator Lindsey Graham – a pro-Israel hawk – claimed last week that Tehran is able to produce six nuclear bombs, though this has not been confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In reality Iran has become a threshold nuclear state, with the capability to assemble a nuclear bomb within weeks rather than months. In the wake of Israel’s operations, especially since the start of the Gaza war which has degraded Iran’s regional affiliates Hamas and Hezbollah, along with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria, some hardliners in the Iranian clerical leadership have called for crossing the threshold for deterrence purposes.

The two sides have entered current negotiations with a huge trust deficit and juxtaposed positions. At a minimum, Washington would want Tehran to permanently forego any capability to produce nuclear weapons, and thus downgrade its uranium enrichment to 3.67% purity as was the case under the JCPOA, destroy or transfer to Russia its stockpile of enriched uranium, and pose no military threat to US interests and Israel. This may prove to be a tall order for the Iranian regime, which seeks negotiations to focus only on the nuclear issue and not to include Iran’s conventional military capabilities.

Tehran’s basic demands include that the US unfreeze Iranian assets, annul all sanctions, and conclude a nuclear treaty approved by the US Congress whereby no future American administration could abrogate it. Tehran also wants to preserve its right to uranium enrichment, along with the ability to restore its nuclear capability in the event of the US violating the deal. Further, it would like to see a nuclear-free Middle East, including Israel.

A new nuclear deal would require difficult compromises. However, Trump’s image as both a ‘tough’ and ‘flexible’ dealmaker and Khamenei’s ijtihadi dimension could intersect to bear fruit leading to a deal. Trump does not seem to be overly in favour of a war; nor is the Supreme Leader. He is dedicated to regime preservation, especially in the face of mounting domestic political, social and economic problems (fuelled partly by harsh US-led sanctions and largely by Iranian mismanagement and corrupt practices).

However, a deal is unlikely to materialise soon enough for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has advocated military action as the best way to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. On the other hand, since Tehran views Netanyahu as its most dangerous and reckless regional adversary, it would be happy to stonewall him through a deal.

Meanwhile, should diplomacy fail, both sides have prepared for a confrontation. The US has amassed considerable firepower, including B-2 bombers and warships, close to Iran. Iran has put its armed and security forces on full alert, with the promise of a ‘crushing response’. It has also concluded a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia and boosted strategic ties with China. Moscow and Beijing have cautioned the US against any military action.

There is a view in Washington that a war may hasten the fall of the Islamic regime, but it may be an overly optimistic idea, given the nature of the regime and its infrastructure of control over Iranian society. Another war in the highly volatile Middle East may prove to be very damaging not just to the parties directly involved, but to the region and beyond.

The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.