The Crisis of Responsibility to Protect in Myanmar: Failing to Prevent and Respond to Atrocities
Dr Noel M Morada is a Visiting Research Professor at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Conflict Resolution, Atrocities Prevention and Human Security, Chulalongkorn University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland and Co-Chair of the Asia Pacific Working Group at Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes.
For over three years, since the February 2021 coup, the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar has continued to worsen with over 2.6 million people now internally displaced by ongoing violence in the country. Civilians in conflict-affected areas are facing hunger, disease, and malnutrition with limited access to humanitarian aid. Amidst calls from ASEAN and the UN to halt its violent attacks against civilians and as it struggles to contain widespread and intensifying resistance from ethnic armed groups and civilian defence forces across the country, the junta remains defiant.
The crisis in Myanmar has also spilled over into its neighbours as refugees, deserting junta soldiers, and young people avoiding military conscription flee to India, Bangladesh, and Thailand. As the junta increasingly relies on illicit economic activities such as drug and human trafficking, as well as cybercrimes to sustain its hold on power, the crisis also presents a human security problem for the region. Various nationals from ASEAN countries and territories; Taiwan, Hongkong, and China have fallen victim to illegal recruitment to work in cybercrime hubs in Myanmar and along its border with Thailand and Laos.
The ongoing atrocities in Myanmar has been overshadowed by the war in Ukraine since 2022 and subsequently by the ongoing crisis in Gaza. In fact, in Southeast Asia, the crisis in Myanmar has been viewed with concern but of lesser importance compared to the war in Gaza and Ukraine based on a recent survey released by a Singapore think tank. This may be partly due to ASEAN’s lack of effective regional diplomacy on the Myanmar crisis as the junta refuses to fully implement the Five-Point Consensus (FPC) reached with ASEAN leaders in April 2021.
The Crisis of R2P in Myanmar
Immediately after the February 2021 coup, human rights defenders and civil society groups within and outside Myanmar invoked the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the military began its violent crackdown against unarmed civilians.
The principle was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 and underscores the primary responsibility of states to “protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing including their incitement.” It also obligates member states of the UN to help other states in building their capacity to prevent the four crimes covered by the principle.
If states manifestly fail in their primary responsibility to protect their populations from atrocities, the burden shifts onto the international community to uphold R2P by invoking the relevant chapters of the UN Charter, including the use of force and sanctions, as well as other peaceful means. The UN Security Council is the principal body that can invoke and enforce R2P in responding to mass atrocities in coordination with regional organisations or sub-regional arrangements.
The persistent manifest failure of the Myanmar state to uphold the principle of R2P began long before the February 2021 coup and is rooted in the uninterrupted dominance of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) in the socio-political and economic landscape of the country. Under the 2008 Constitution, its operational autonomy, annual budget and institutional and economic interests are protected. Specifically, there are no mechanisms in place for the civilian government to conduct oversight investigations and hold the military accountable for its actions. The constitution also guarantees military control of 25% of seats in the union and state/regional parliaments, which enabled it to block efforts by the National League for Democracy to amend the constitution and rein in the military’s power.
The military has been the main perpetrator of atrocities in Myanmar. Ethnic minority groups and the Muslim population in Rakhine such as the Rohingya people have been targets of discriminatory policies and violence by the Tatmadaw. Following its military operations in Rakhine in 2017, which saw over 6,000 people killed and over 700,000 Rohingya refugees flee to Bangladesh, Myanmar is facing cases in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
More cases may be filed in connection with recent atrocities that have been committed by the military since the February 2021 coup. This includes military air strikes that killed hundreds of civilians in Northern and Central Myanmar, targeting villages, houses of worship, hospitals, and schools. As of 17 July this year, close to 5,400 people have been killed by junta forces since the coup, with over 27,000 arrested and more than 20,700 still held in detention.
It is significant to note that atrocities in Myanmar have also been perpetrated by other actors. This includes Buddhist nationalist monks who incited violent attacks against Muslim Rohingya communities in Rakhine in 2012, which spread to other parts of the country thereafter. They also attacked Christian and Hindu communities in major urban centres in 2013 and 2014. The MaBaTha, led by the notorious Buddhist nationalist monk Ashin Wirathu, spearheaded a campaign to “protect” the country’s majority race and religion, resulting in the passage of four discriminatory laws in 2014 (referred to as Protection of Race and Religion laws). These laws forbid inter-faith marriages between Burmese Buddhist women and non-Buddhist men; control population growth amongst Muslim communities, ban religious conversion and restrict polygamy.
In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, atrocities have also been committed by pro-junta militias as well as by some anti-coup resistance forces using targeted assassinations of suspected supporters or sympathisers of the junta government. Although the shadow anti-coup National Unity Government (NUG) said that it encourages allied armed civilian resistance forces to abide by international human rights and humanitarian laws, it does not have full and effective control over these forces. For example, there were sexual abuses against women prisoners committed by some police officers under the NUG. In eastern Shan State, there was an exponential increase in atrocities committed by resistance forces such as the sexual abuse of women, forcible recruitment of civilians and home robberies, while the ethnic Karen National Union (KNU) is reportedly involved in the Myanmar cyberscam hub. In Rakhine, Rohingya men were forcibly recruited by the Myanmar military to fight against the Arakha Army (AA, an anti-junta militia). In May, the UN Human Rights Office in Geneva said that it had received reports of massive displacement of Rohingya civilians and burning of villages after the capture of Buthidaung township by AA forces. However, the AA denied that it committed atrocities against the Rohingya and other Muslims in the area and asserted that it is providing civilian protection to all Muslims in areas of Rakhine where it has effective control.
Failure of Regional and International Diplomatic Responses
The failure of R2P in Myanmar is a reflection of failing regional and international diplomatic efforts in finding a path towards ending the atrocities in the country. ASEAN’s FPC has been rendered dead over the last three years given the junta’s continuing defiance and uncooperative stance in implementing the agreement. The de facto “suspension” of Myanmar from participating in the ASEAN summit of leaders and other high-level meetings has not effectively exerted pressure on the military. In fact, some member states of the regional organisation have not been completely on board with the FPC agreement, with Thailand independently pursuing its own bilateral diplomatic initiatives in dealing with the Myanmar crisis.
Even so, Bangkok’s “humanitarian corridor” proposal, endorsed early this year by ASEAN foreign ministers, has been criticised by some humanitarian NGOs and human rights advocates, as well as by the NUG as giving legitimacy to the junta. The proposal will rely on the junta-controlled Myanmar Red Cross to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, intense fighting between junta soldiers and anti-coup resistance fighters along the border with Thailand has paused any efforts. The spill over effects of the fighting at the border prompted the Thai government to call on Laos, the current ASEAN Chair, to activate the troika mechanism to give priority attention to the crisis in Myanmar. Despite the change in government in Thailand, it is unlikely that Bangkok will assume a leading role in pushing for fresh initiatives that attempt to break the current impasse. Malaysia, as the next ASEAN Chair in 2025, however, may pursue additional measures that could exert more diplomatic pressure on the junta to restore peace and stability.
At the UN, the recent appointment of former Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop as the new Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar is unlikely to make material difference to the junta’s attitude. It is likely that she will work closely with ASEAN in coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre, which will be a priority. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council remains inutile and dysfunctional. It has consistently failed to pass any resolution on Myanmar as China and Russia veto it to protect their respective strategic interests in the country. This is no different from the US consistently vetoing resolutions against Israel despite overwhelming support for resolutions in the General Assembly condemning atrocities in Myanmar and Gaza, respectively.
Overall, the crisis in Myanmar raises important questions regarding the implementation of R2P in conflict-affected countries. For one, should the international community support armed civilian resistance groups, including channelling humanitarian aid through them, while the junta continues to commit atrocities against civilians? As regional and international diplomatic efforts fail in upholding R2P and in ending atrocities in Myanmar, are civilians justified in taking up arms to protect themselves against crimes perpetrated by the military government, which has become the aggressor and oppressor? What are the important lessons from the Myanmar crisis and their long-term implications for implementing the R2P principle, including overcoming the challenges and structural constraints faced by regional organisations such as ASEAN as well as the UN in fulfilling their respective roles in upholding and implementing the norm?
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not of the RSAA.