Supporting Iran’s minorities risks playing with fire
James M Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Iran may have played into Israel and the United States’s hands by firing drones and missiles at Azerbaijan and Turkey. Beyond risking drawing these countries into the conflict, the attacks could inadvertently fuel ethnic unrest inside Iran, even though US President Donald Trump, in a seeming reversal, recently ruled out encouraging Kurdish groups to intervene. Speaking to reporters on Air Force One, he said, “They’re willing to go in, but we really – I’ve told them I don’t want them to go in. The war is complicated enough without having, getting the Kurds involved.”
It is unclear whether Trump’s about-face will influence Israel, which has maintained longstanding relations with Iranian Kurdish and other armed ethnic groups. Meanwhile, US and Israeli strikes have targeted military, security, and intelligence bases along a swath stretching from the Azerbaijan-Iran border to Kurdish-populated areas near Iraq. About 20% of these bombings have focused on Kurdish and Azeri areas, potentially creating an environment conducive to ethnic unrest. Former US ambassador Robert S Ford noted that the campaign “suggests the intent is to facilitate Iranian government loss of control in restive regions.”
To further foment unrest in Azeri areas and encourage IRGC defections, the far-right, pro-Israel US group Middle East Forum has advocated targeting Azeri-led Guard units accused of brutal crackdowns during the January anti-government protests, which resulted in thousands of deaths. Azeris command many IRGC units in northwestern Iran, and while they assert cultural and ethnic identity more vocally – demanding schooling in their own language, turning to Turkish and Azeri media, and participating in Turkish consular programs – these actions do not necessarily translate into substantial pushes for autonomy, unification with Azerbaijan, or independence.
As a result, Kurds have emerged as the primary focus of US and Israeli minority strategies. Iranian Kurdish cooperation, including providing targeting intelligence to the US and Israel, initially reinforced this focus. However, past experience in Syria – where Syrian Kurds who fought alongside the US ultimately saw the administration side with Turkey and the Syrian government against Kurdish autonomy – has left Iranian Kurds cautious. A newly formed coalition of Iranian Kurdish groups that spoke with Trump and met with US intelligence officials in Erbil has proceeded slowly: they have yet to create a joint operations room or appoint a spokesperson.
Ethnic unrest is not limited to Iran’s west and northwest. The Sistan and Baluchistan province, bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, is home to armed Baloch groups eager to exploit opportunities created by the Iran war. Meanwhile, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan fester, with the international community largely focused on Iran. Gulf states, including Qatar, are preoccupied with defending themselves from Iranian strikes and avoiding deeper entanglement.
Voices in the Gulf are also expressing frustration over US involvement. Emirati billionaire Khalaf Al-Habtoor, a close associate of Dubai’s ruling family and a past advocate for the secession of Khuzestan, criticised Trump in an open letter, asking, “Who gave you the authority to drag our region into a war with Iran? You have placed the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab countries at the heart of a danger they did not choose.”
Al-Habtoor’s letter is notable given the UAE’s historical support for rebel and secessionist movements in Somalia, Sudan, and Libya – a policy that previously sparked tension with Saudi Arabia, which backs internationally recognised governments in those countries. During anti-government protests in Khuzestan in 2015, Al-Habtoor called for the “liberation” of the province’s five million Arabs, referring to it as “Arabistan” and framing the population as struggling under Persian rule along the Iraq-Arabian Gulf border.
The calculation is clear: supporting Iran’s minorities carries high risks. While ethnic unrest might weaken Tehran temporarily, it could just as easily ignite a far broader crisis, drawing regional powers and local populations deeper into a conflict they neither chose nor fully control.
James M Dorsey is the Associate Editor of WhoWhatWhy, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M Dorsey. He is also a member of the International Editorial Advisory Board of the RSAA’s journal, Asian Affairs.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.
