Politics and Religion: Sectarianism in the Middle East
Professor Simon Mabon is Director of the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project at Lancaster University’s Richardson Institute and Chair in International Politics
On 12 January, US and UK militaries struck targets across Yemen in an effort to prevent Houthi attacks against ships passing through the Red Sea. The Houthis, a violently intolerant Islamist group from North Yemen had embarked on a series of attacks in opposition to Israel’s devastating bombardment and continued occupation of Gaza, disrupting global supply routes in the process.
Media coverage of the Houthis often portray them as group controlled by Iran, a quintessential example of what has been referred to as a client or proxy group. The reality, however, is far more complex, revealing a nuanced and multifaceted set of relationships cutting across politics, ideology, religion, sect, and ethnicity. At the heart of such problematic narratives is a broader sense that politics across the Middle East remains a product of sectarian difference pitting Sunni against Shi’a in a geopolitically charged struggle, aided and abetted by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively.
The rivalry between the two major Gulf powers has been central to the machinations of regional politics since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, oscillating between periods of antagonism and rapprochement over the following 45 years. Yet the rivalry has also reverberated across the region, manifesting in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and beyond, including in India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the US.
Efforts to understand the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran take a range of forms. Simplistic accounts depict Saudi Arabia and Iran on opposite sides of a centuries long conflict within Islam, the contemporary manifestation of ‘ancient hatreds’ between Sunni and Shi’a. Others dismiss the importance of religion entirely, reducing the rivalry to a form of power politics, where religion is used instrumentally in pursuit of national interest. More nuanced accounts look at the ways in which religion resonates across political and social life.
Advocates of the ‘ancient hatreds’ approach ignore centuries of entanglement across societies, politics, economics and families. This position has been articulated ad nauseum in Western policy circles and media outlets. For advocates of this position, sectarian difference is traced back to the formative years of Islam and tensions over the leadership of the caliphate after the death of the Prophet. These tensions began as fundamentally political issues, questions over succession, but over time took on theological components, leading to the emergence of different sects within Islam.
While Barack Obama’s 2016 State of the Union address is perhaps the best example of this, depicting instability in the Middle East as a product of “conflicts that date back millennia” he is far from alone. Recent articles in leading global politics outlets have possessed strong undercurrents of this ‘ancient hatreds’ narrative, pointing to a broader set of political and intellectual issues with the study of sectarianism. Scholarship within ‘Sectarianism Studies’ has forensically dismantled such approaches, highlighting the plurality of experiences within and between sectarian communities.
Historically, Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged with co-sectarian kin across the region. They have provided financial, political, and in some cases military support to their allies, but despite superficial generalisations, these allies are not always based on sectarian affinity. Indeed, in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia has cultivated links with Sunni and Christian groups in pursuit of their goals, namely to counter gains made by Hizballah and, by extension, Iran. Similarly, in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, cultivated ties with Iraqi nationalists (amongst others) who are broadly Shi’a, in an attempt to assert greater levels of influence in a state where Iran wielded vast influence. In Yemen, Saudi support to the internationally recognised government involved dealing with Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi Shi’a, which was a direct response to the actions of the Houthis, a Zaydi Shi’a group and others whose actions had led to widespread fragmentation. In contrast, Iranian support for the Houthis fuses sectarian and ideological affinities: while Iran and the Houthis follow different strands of Shi’a thought – Twelver and Zaydi respectively – the relationship between the two is underscored by a shared support for the Palestinian cause and an explicit stance against Israel, made ‘real’ through the ‘axis of resistance’ alliance.
Despite the rejection of the ‘ancient hatreds’ narrative, those who dismiss the salience of sectarian identities risk throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. Religion matters, albeit in a range of ways, conditioned by the peculiarities of time and space.
As a result, the manifestation of sectarian difference also takes a range of forms across time, and space: relations between sectarian communities differ dramatically as a result of political, social, economic and geopolitical contexts. Moreover, sectarianism may also take different forms within states, reflecting the complexity and contingency of identity construction and performance. For example, Sunni Muslims in Beirut differ dramatically from Sunni Muslims in Tripoli despite ostensibly co-nationalists and members of the same sect. In part, this stems from different levels of religiosity, but it also highlights the importance of context.
While Sunnism and Shi’ism are the dominant sects within Islam, they are far from monolithic. The Houthis, for example, follow the Zaydi strand of Shi’ism unlike in Iran where the Twelver strand is prominent. There are subtle yet important differences between the two strands, pertaining to leadership of the Caliphate, and the ways in which Imams are chosen.
Shi’ism initially emerged as a political movement – Shi’at Ali [the Partisans of Ali] comprised of people who held that only the male descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, were worthy to rule. These male descendants became Imams, yet much like the disagreement that led to the emergence of Shi’at Ali, which descendant was to be considered Imam provoked consternation. Additionally, Twelvers believe that one becomes an Imam through appointment of the Prophet or a previous Imam while Zaydis believe that the forming of consensus allows an Imam to assume the position. In addition to theological difference, the Houthis and Iran are also differentiated from each other by virtue of ethnic and linguistic differences, further challenging the proxy/client narrative.
Despite these points of difference, there are other aspects of Shi’a thought that are common to both Zaydis and Twelvers, going some way to explain the relationship between the Houthis and Iran. Here, ideas of rebellion, resistance, guilt and martyrdom are key features of Zaydi and Twelver thought, manifesting in the contemporary words and deeds of the Houthis and Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran articulates a fraternal support to the ‘downtrodden’ of the Muslim world in its Constitution, with support for the Palestinian cause a common feature. The Houthi slogan ‘God is great, death to the U.S, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam’ can be read through the lens of rebellion and resistance, a mode of anti-Imperialism that sets the group against the US and Israel; Houthi actions in the Red Sea began in an attempt to end the Israeli bombardment against Gaza. And yet, both Iran and the Houthis have also engaged in acts contrary to this stance, with the Islamic Republic propping up Bashar al-Assad in Syria where they are complicit in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, while the Houthis have been deeply intolerant of other sects and faiths in Yemen, repressed women and minorities, and used child soldiers. Their actions in the Red Sea, however, have cultivated widespread support across the Muslim world, cutting across sectarian divisions. The so-called Axis of Resistance is emblematic of this, bringing together a range of sectarian communities, nationalities, ethnicities and languages under a shared ideological vision of opposition to Israel and the United States.
To reduce the Middle East to antagonistic sectarian difference is to view the region through an Orientalist and deeply problematic lens. Rather, it is imperative to look at the region in such a way that pays attention to the importance of religion and its political machinations, but not to overemphasise it. The contemporary geopolitical environment is a complex one and is in flux, but the normalisation agreement between Riyadh and Tehran highlighted that sectarian difference is not insurmountable, that it is, but one factor in a more complex, political and geopolitical landscape.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not of the RSAA.
