Kazakhstan’s New “Middle Power” Myth
Charles J Sullivan, PhD is a scholar on Central Asia and the author of Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War
Kazakhstan is a developing country with substantial promise. It is a major oil exporter and its territory holds important rare earth deposits. Kazakhstan’s population of twenty million is rather small, but the country is vast in terms of its geographic size. Yet is it accurate to classify Kazakhstan as a “middle power,” and if not, then why is the country becoming affiliated with this new geopolitical catchphrase? If Great Powers boast diversified robust economies, sizable populations, advanced militaries, and the ability to influence geopolitics, then middle powers must possess some – but not all – of these features. Judging by such criteria, however, Kazakhstan does not exhibit any of these hallmarks. Instead, the Kazakh government is endorsing a new myth, in furtherance of buttressing its legitimacy at home and abroad.
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan serves as an important regional player. That said, it is not very difficult for Astana to stand out from its neighbours when Kazakhstan’s competition consists of other highly personalist, repressive, authoritarian states (like in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), former pariahs (such as Uzbekistan until 2016), governments plagued by a history of instability (Kyrgyzstan), or countries in abject desperation (Afghanistan). However, this picture disintegrates when Kazakhstan is compared to genuine middle powers like Germany, Spain, Italy, South Korea, France, and the United Kingdom. These states classify as middle powers due to their impressive military industrial complexes and arms exports, economic capabilities, capacities to project varying degrees of hard and soft power abroad, considerably large populations, and relative autonomy vis-à-vis the Great Powers of today. Granted, such states should not be counted amongst the ranks of the United States, Russia, and China, but they do bear at least some (though clearly not all) of the hallmarks of what makes a Great Power “great.” By contrast, it is wholly naïve to posit that Kazakhstan belongs to this select group. Yet some laud Kazakhstan’s middle power status, and the routine extolling of Kazakhstan’s alleged stature helps to ensure that this phrase is becoming synonymous with the country. In brief, it all amounts to hype.
Starting in 2024, several op-ed pieces (one of which was actually penned by the sitting President of Kazakhstan), articles, and reports began proclaiming Kazakhstan as a middle power (supposedly on par with regional powerhouses like Türkiye, India, and Brazil – three countries which incidentally dwarf Kazakhstan in military expenditures, annual GDP, and population size). An article published in The Astana Times even claims that Central Asia stands as a relatively peaceful region in part because of Kazakhstan’s sound policies and geographic location serving as a “buffer” for its neighbours. Other articles seem to stress that the absence of an effective regional security organization which includes all of the five Central Asian republics has played a contributory role in fostering Kazakhstan’s elevation to becoming a middle power. But Kazakhstan is a member state of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization today, which means that Astana is firmly aligned (and in a formal alliance) with Moscow. Is Kazakhstan’s autonomy vis-à-vis Russia sufficient enough so that Astana could leave the EAEU or CSTO (which played a key role in stabilizing a truly dire situation in Kazakhstan in January 2022) if it so desired and without incurring any risk to its sovereignty? Moreover, Kazakhstan buys a stunning amount of its arms from Russia, and China and Russia serve as Kazakhstan’s top trading partners today. Kazakhstan also heralds its “multivector” foreign policy. Designed by Kazakhstan’s former longstanding (now disgraced) autocrat Nursultan Nazarbayev, this doctrine underscores maintaining positive relationships with other states, and particularly the Great Powers. Yet this doctrine works well only under conditions of limited Great Power competition, and Kazakhstan prefers to engage in “hedging,” instead of “balancing” against any of the Great Powers. Astana does not assume antagonistic stances vis-à-vis any of the Great Powers on contentious geopolitical issues, so the Kazakh government instead often assumes ambiguous postures. This constitutes hedging. Still, from Kazakhstan’s vantage, it sounds better if Astana is vigorously balancing Moscow, Beijing, and Washington’s interests in a high-stakes “Great Game.” It is tempting to think that Kazakhstan wields clout in the global arena, but this is just a ruse.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has even stated that Kazakhstan is now considered as a middle power. It is really important, however, for fragile authoritarian states to face harsh realities. Actual middle powers do not proclaim their status to buttress their popular legitimacy. Instead, they rely on institutions to govern transparently and responsibly, and they mitigate sociopolitical friction by ensuring that citizens partake in deciding who wields power. By contrast, Kazakhstan in early 2022 (in the midst of mass protests and an apparent coup attempt by an elite faction within the government) managed to avert a state collapse only when Tokayev (Nazarbayev’s chosen successor – who assumed the presidency in mid-2019 in a state-managed process) turned to the (Russia-led) Collective Security Treaty Organization for assistance and issued a controversial shoot-to-kill order. Since then, order has been restored and the Kazakh government has instituted a series of “cosmetic” reforms while handling relations with Moscow and the West during the Russo-Ukrainian War. But the notion that Kazakhstan has catapulted itself into middle power stardom within just a few years and become a key player on the world stage is hyperbole. Kazakhstan is simply fortunate that it survived “Bloody January” intact.
Today, the notion that the rules-based international legal order is disintegrating, and that the future will be defined by a return to spheres of influence, is a common expression. Although “sphere of influence” is an antiquated term, an era of intense rivalry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing presents more of a challenge than an opportunity for Kazakhstan. In addition to being situated between Russia and China, Kazakhstan faces an uphill climb in enhancing ties with the United States. Washington does not perceive Central Asia as a region of strategic importance (compared to the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and Europe), and Kazakhstan has been a subject of criticism in outlets owing to Astana’s seeming unwillingness/inability to fully abide by the Western sanctions regime against Russia. Furthermore, the failure of the Astana Process (which the Kazakh government ended in 2023) to resolve Syria’s civil war indicates that Kazakhstan’s cities will not be serving anytime soon as venues for foreign powers to engage in sincere negotiations to resolve protracted conflicts. Great Powers do honestly care about the geopolitical orientations of middle powers. Yet Kazakhstan is ensconced within the Kremlin’s “sphere” and Astana does not appear to be lessening its ties with Russia or breaking away from Moscow. Kazakhstan’s ability to shape geopolitics is, to say the least, very limited.
Kazakhstan needs to avoid believing its own hype. States formulate strategies based on their available instruments of power in furtherance of realizing defined objectives. That said, the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal instruments of a weak state differ considerably from those of any middle power. Assumptions constitute a crucial aspect of any strategy, and history reveals that faulty assumptions – grounded in a state’s flawed perceptions of its own capabilities – can lead any strategist to fail (which can be devastating). In this sense, scholars and think tanks are doing Kazakhstan a disservice by hyping it as a middle power. Instead, Western powers (which do not seek to dominate Kazakhstan’s affairs) need to strongly emphasize that Astana can expand its instruments of power by building liberal-oriented institutions. Tokayev has recently steered a set of positive initiatives and attracted foreign investment. But Kazakhstan’s system still bears a very eerie resemblance to the Nazarbayev era. If Kazakhstan aspires to be a middle power and chart its own course in world affairs, then Astana must augment its capabilities by enacting meaningful reforms.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.
Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War
This book provides an overview of the major developments in Kazakhstan over the past decade. This book offers readers a timely understanding concerning how power has been wielded, mishandled, and reasserted in this country. It explores the achievements of Kazakhstan’s modernisation drive, the government’s prolonged initial political transition, the rise of a local civil society, the events of January 2022, and Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia and the West.
