Ismaili Tradition and its Global Communities in the Modern World
Wafi A. Momin is an Assistant Professor and Head of the Ismaili Special Collections Unit at The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London
The Ismailis form a branch of Shia Islam and, though numerically much smaller in comparison to the Ithna‘ashari (‘Twelver’) brand of the Shias, are among the most prosperous and progressive of the Muslim communities today. They live as diverse ethnic and cultural groups in the regions of their historical settlements, notably in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, South Asia, Syria and Yemen, and reside as sizeable diasporic or growing migrant communities in East Africa, Western Europe, North America, Russia, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand.
There are two main subdivisions among the contemporary Ismailis, namely the Nizaris and the Tayyibis. The Nizaris are numerically the largest of the two; they follow Prince Karim Aga Khan (b. 1936) as their present hereditary spiritual leader (imam) in a line going back to the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and cousin, Ali – the first Imam revered by all the Shias. Better known as Bohras, the Tayyibis, on the other hand, follow different lines of supreme heads (da‘i al-mutlaqs), being subdivided into multiple groups of varied numerical strength. While these heads, in theological terms, are representatives of the ‘concealed’ Imam, they have acquired for all functional purposes a role almost on par with the Imam.
The doctrines and religious life of the Ismaili communities are deeply anchored in their Shia-Ismaili heritage. They have nurtured, guarded and passed down this heritage over some twelve centuries as a distinct tradition. They have expressed the key ideals of this heritage through philosophical, theological and legal treatises, as well as literary masterpieces and poetic compositions appealing to the masses, which in turn have shaped their sacred sensibilities and a resilient identity firmly rooted in history. In the modern world, the ‘Ismaili’ identity, particularly as embraced by the followers of the Nizari tradition, is both global, cutting across national boundaries, and particular to the societies where the Ismailis have long flourished, profoundly impacted and shaped by the respective cultures and socio-political environments.
In other words, while the diverse Ismaili communities have shared a great deal in religious beliefs and practices, their understandings of what it meant to live by the principles of their faith were not insulated from how they observed such principles in their respective social and political settings. The resulting contextual interpretations, furthermore, have given rise to distinct strands in religious worldviews which continue to live on and characterise Ismaili communities today. Thus, the relationship between global articulations of faith and practice, as channelled and reinforced by a vast network of internationally connected institutions, and local expressions of beliefs has at times been a source of tension, especially as historically marginalised or peripheral communities have strived to find a voice within centralised narratives framing the Ismaili identity and defining its constitutive elements.
As in the domain of religious life, the Ismailis represent incredible diversity, notwithstanding their relatively small size, in terms of customs and languages, social outlook, economic status, educational profile, and on questions of gender equality and political aspirations. So, for example, despite being interconnected through a shared body of doctrines, a diasporic group in urban Canada going back three generations or so has come to cultivate distinct traits and fare differently in terms of access to economic opportunities and education from the centuries-old ethnic communities in the remote mountain regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.
Bridging this gap and ensuring accessibility to at least the basic necessities of life in less privileged contexts, for example healthcare, education, housing and employment for those in remote communities or in war-affected countries, are among the key objectives of a vast network of institutions largely organised under the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), founded by Prince Karim Aga Khan. Such institutions are by no means confined to serving the needs of the Ismailis alone, rather their humanitarian work and socio-economic and educational programmes cater for people of all classes and creeds. Nonetheless, the bulk of the institutions within the network are largely working on improving quality of life in Asia and Africa where the Ismailis constitute sizeable populations, albeit operating on a non-denominational basis.
The matter of political aspiration is another area where we see conflicting realities among the contemporary Ismailis and their institutions. For example, in the Western world, particularly in North America, where many Ismailis have recently launched their political careers and made inroads into government offices, their achievements have called for recognition, even celebration, through official platforms. However, much older cases (and perhaps far more critical and challenging) of Ismaili political participation in the regions where their communities have historically constituted substantial majorities, such as many parts of Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan, Gorno-Badakhshan of Tajikistan, and several districts of Afghanistan, seem to have fallen on deaf ears, with hardly any official recognition or mention of Ismaili politicians, government and public office holders, or their tireless work for their respective constituencies in those regions.
A major reason for this exclusion may be found in the cautious attitude generally adopted by the institutions of the Ismaili Imamate in remaining apolitical, especially in the above-mentioned regions where AKDN’s humanitarian work is intensely focused. This is to avoid, perhaps, the likely pairing of Ismaili political and public figures with the AKDN institutions in public eyes and any resulting propaganda motivated by religious-political ideologies. But the consequential imbalance that such an attitude has generated has not allayed the anxieties of many Ismailis, in fact it has disenchanted them from the institutions to some extent especially in those regions where taking part in the political process is an integral national and social responsibility for Ismaili communities as key stakeholders in society.
In the case of Nizari Ismailis (who are geographically far more dispersed), their leadership observes a general distancing from any official or overt support to a specific political party. On this matter, the unequivocal guidelines of the present and the last Imam (Aga Khan III, Sultan Mohamed Shah) for their followers has been to observe loyalty to their respective countries, irrespective of the political parties they may support. This has cultivated a transnational ethos and identity, interconnecting global Ismaili communities through bonds of spiritual loyalty to the Imam, not through political aspirations or territorial and nationalistic proclivities. On the other hand, in the case of Daudi Bohras, who are numerically the largest of the Bohra communities, an undisguised political support in countries like India has not been off cards. Thus, the religious leadership of Daudi Bohras and their followers, with their headquarters in Bombay and a strong base in the state of Gujarat, have been close supporters of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bhartiya Janata Party, which has ruled Gujarat since 1995 and India, along with coalition partners, since 2014.
A deep sense of rootedness in their time-honoured heritage has by no means made the Ismaili communities oblivious to the demands of modern life. In fact, under the guidance of their leadership, both the Nizaris and the Tayyibis, have creatively sought to align their faith with modern values within the limitations of their own societies. This creative (and ongoing) harmonising between faith and modern values has, however, invited reactions of different sorts in the societies where the Ismailis live. Hence, while among the Western nations and in countries like India where Muslims constitute a minority the Ismaili communities have come to be viewed as progressive and comparatively liberal, in other conservative and Muslim majority contexts like parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Ismailis are frequently seen as ‘Westernised’ in a pejorative sense.
As the Ismailis look ahead to the future, they continue to face new challenges, some arising out of global developments others of local import. Foremost among these challenges is the urgent need to strike a balance between a global transnational identity and accommodating the cherished ideals of localised expressions of faith, so as to avoid the tempting snare of homogenisation. But in dealing with all these challenges they possess a solid institutional infrastructure, even when some sections may be discontent with certain institutional practices for the time being. Above all, they have among their ranks a growing number of young, educated members who are committed to taking on the challenges of making their faith relevant in a globalised and rapidly changing world under the guidance of their religious leadership.
*title image credit: reproduced from the the.ismaili website – His Highness the Aga Khan, the present Imam of the Nizari Ismailis.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not of the RSAA.
