Türkiye’s Strategic Entrenchment in the Middle East
Buğrahan Demir is the Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Drill & Defense
Before 2011, Türkiye had a limited but predictable impact on the Middle East. Relations with the region were mainly conducted through diplomatic channels, trade, and energy transit, while military involvement was generally seen as an exception. This picture began to change markedly after 2011. However, it is insufficient to explain this transformation solely through individual developments such as the Arab Spring or the Syrian Civil War. When viewed from a broader perspective, the core issue concerns Türkiye’s approach to power vacuums and how this approach has been shaped by long-standing preferences over time. At the point we have reached today, Türkiye has moved beyond being a temporary actor; rather, through its decisions and the relationships it has established, it has become a constant part of the regional equation.
One of the areas where this transformation is most visible is Syria. Between 2015 and 2016, particularly with the eastern part of Aleppo falling under regime control and Russia’s direct military involvement, the balance in the region shifted significantly. After this stage, Türkiye’s view of Syria underwent a notable change. The operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring were not limited solely to military targets; they also created new realities on the ground, extending from Jarablus to El Bab and from Afrin to Tel Abyad. The establishment of local administrations, security units, and logistical services in these areas has demonstrated that Türkiye’s presence in the region is far from temporary.
At this point, it must also be emphasised that Türkiye did not choose to act merely as a negotiator or an observer during the Syrian crisis. Instead, it opted to remain in the region as one of the direct parties. This preference enabled Ankara to have a seat at the negotiating table, but it also brought with it a position that requires continuous engagement and negotiation with Russia, Iran, and the United States. As the Syrian issue evolved, it became not only a security matter but also a long-term, multilayered geopolitical presence. Although less visible than in Syria, the situation in Iraq reflects a quieter yet more established approach. The Bashiqa Camp, the Qandil area, and the Zap-Metina lines stand out as concrete examples of Türkiye’s military presence in Iraq. Despite Baghdad’s periodic objections on the grounds of sovereignty, these activities have continued for years. The determining factor is that Ankara accounted for these objections from the outset. In other words, diplomatic tension in Iraq has been treated as an accepted cost. While this approach has made Türkiye an indirect part of Iraq’s internal security balance, it has also meant that instability in the country has more direct consequences for Türkiye.
Another issue that is as significant as the military dimension is energy. Without considering energy routes and logistical security, it is difficult to fully assess Türkiye’s position in the Middle East. The pipeline extending from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq to Ceyhan, Adana, lies at the centre of this relationship. The oil transported through this pipeline represents not only a source of financial income but also a recurring political balancing issue. Periodic disruptions, legal disputes, and objections from the central government are direct developments affecting Türkiye’s energy security. For this reason, Ankara has chosen not to leave energy matters solely to market dynamics, instead addressing them through security and diplomatic frameworks.
A similar fragility applies to natural gas flows. Sanctions, regional tensions, and infrastructure security concerns have made Türkiye more sensitive to developments in the Middle East energy sector. This sensitivity stands out as a factor encouraging Türkiye to remain more engaged and to respond more rationally to regional fluctuations.
The discovery of natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, off the coasts of Israel and Egypt, has redefined the geopolitical relationship between the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Projects such as EastMed conveyed political messages beyond their technical feasibility. Türkiye assessed exclusion from these projects as both an economic loss and a long-term geopolitical risk. From this perspective, it adopted a stricter maritime policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, tensions with Greece and Cyprus intensified, while competition with Egypt and Israel took on a more indirect yet stable form.
In the Gulf context, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates hold a distinctive place. The tensions between Ankara and Riyadh after 2018 narrowed Türkiye’s strategic economic and political manoeuvring in the region. The normalisation process that began after 2021 reflected a different preference. This process was shaped by concrete assessments related to economic needs and the necessity of reducing regional isolation, rather than by an ideological shift. It serves as another example of Türkiye’s Middle East policy advancing largely through pragmatic considerations.
Overall, this picture highlights the constrained strategic space Türkiye has been forced to navigate while maintaining relations simultaneously with the United States, Russia, and Iran. The United States’ cooperation with the YPG in Syria, Russia’s air superiority, and Iran’s ties with militias have pushed Ankara to seek a continuous balancing act. While this balance offers short-term flexibility, it reduces long-term predictability. Türkiye is neither fully aligned with any single actor nor entirely detached from them. Ultimately, Türkiye is viewed as indispensable, yet at times as an actor whose reliability is questioned.
From this perspective, Türkiye’s expanding role in the Middle East should not be interpreted solely as a story of necessity or justification. Rather, it reflects a series of deliberate decisions, strategic choices already made, and costs that have been consciously accepted. Türkiye chose to enter the field, leveraged the influence this provided, and has gradually reached a point where withdrawal has become increasingly difficult. Today, Türkiye is not a power that shapes the entire order, but it is not outside the order either. For this reason, understanding Türkiye’s role in the Middle East requires moving beyond narratives of defence or legitimacy and instead focusing on strategic choices, tangible outcomes on the ground, and the question of long-term sustainability.
*title image – US and Turkish troops rendezvous in northern Syria, 4 October 2019. US and Turkish forces had conducted joint ground patrols in northern Syria in efforts to maintain security and reduce the chances of Kurdish-Turkish clashes.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.
