Marcus Andreopoulos and Eve Register are Researchers at the Asia-Pacific Foundation and both work closely with NATO DEEP’s Global Threats Advisory Group

Since early April, Pakistan had repeatedly sought to broker a lasting peace between the United States and Iran. Despite failing to achieve a swift peace, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir has used the protracted process to reinforce his position as the country’s chief diplomatic actor, solidifying international recognition of his and the army’s predominance in Pakistani politics. After all, it has been Munir, Trump’s ‘favourite field marshal’, rather than Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, that has spearheaded negotiations between the United States and Iran, travelling to Tehran for talks with Iranian leadership on the one hand, and maintaining a direct line to Trump on the other. During the recent US-Iran talks in Switzerland in June, American Vice President JD Vance reinforced this hierarchy, noting that the most important Pakistani in his life recently has been Munir, not Sharif. Whilst it remains unclear just how much influence Pakistan has wielded in bringing both sides closer to an agreement these past few months, Munir has nevertheless used the opportunity to strengthen his position domestically. Pakistan’s army chief is now openly steering the country’s foreign policy without the need for a coup.

Military coups are nothing new in Pakistan. In the nearly 80 years since achieving independence, the country’s civilian government has been overthrown by its military on three separate occasions. In 1958 and 1977 Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq both respectively seized the reins of power amid grave political instability. In 1999, a clash of personalities and strategic ambitions between General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, brother of current premier Shehbaz, resulted in another coup. Similar conditions appeared to be taking shape once more in April 2022. Yet, despite political instability and a public breakdown between Prime Minister Imran Khan and then-army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, the army abstained from its expected response. Once Munir succeeded Bajwa as Chief of Army Staff in November 2022, he followed a different path to ensure that the military’s power remained firmly intact without the need for another coup. Now, more than three years on, the results of that approach are plain to see.

Pakistan’s military has always had considerable influence both domestically and internationally. Cross-border skirmishes, conflicts, and wars between Pakistan and its neighbour India have been present since their inception following the partition of British India in 1947. The severity of these successive conflicts has led to a bypassing of civilian oversight in decision-making, particularly during times of conflict, but, crucially, also during times of peace. The military has thus used this precedent to establish a pattern of ignoring and overriding civilian institutions.

In response to the perceived threat posed by India’s military capacity, the Pakistani military has been incentivised to broker deals with international partners where troops, intelligence, or strategic co-operation was offered by Pakistan in exchange for payments or resources to fund Pakistan’s own military activities. In 1956, the US brokered such a deal, which stipulated that Pakistan would help the US with their position on the Soviet border in exchange for American hardware, organised through a Military Assistance Advisory Group that went on to provide $600 million of military assistance to Pakistan. This agreement created a template for all future deals between the Pakistani military and its foreign partners, whereby the military would be compensated for its services and manage the payments without consulting with the civilian government.

This model was further reinforced after the 9/11 attacks when Pakistan was seen as a pivotal counter-terrorism ally of the US and their western allies. The US gave billions of dollars of financial aid to Pakistan in exchange for support on the ground, an aid package conveniently designed to require no congressional oversight and virtually no documentation on how this money was used. Even after Pakistan’s status as an ally was called into question when Al-Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were both found hiding in Pakistan, the US continued its alliance with Pakistan’s military.

Empowered by this consistent level of foreign support and financial aid, the Pakistani military has sought to consolidate power domestically by taking over control of civilian institutions. This process accelerated under Prime Minister Imran Khan, whom the Pakistani military allegedly helped come to power. Shortly after, key positions like the Chairman of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Chairman of the National Space Agency and Director-General of the National Database and Registration Authority were all awarded to military personnel, despite these roles having little to do with defence.

The military’s encroachment on civilian institutions continued following Khan’s ouster in 2022 and has accelerating under Munir’s leadership as Chief of Army Staff. In 2023, Pakistan’s Special Investment Facilitation Council was announced with the goal of increased foreign direct investment to Pakistan, which falls squarely within the remit of the civilian government. However, military personnel were awarded half the positions and, more significantly, the most powerful positions, like National Coordinator of the Apex and Executive Committees. The same month it was established, the Council announced a 16% increase in Pakistan’s defence budget, illustrating how the Council’s military weighting influenced pro-military decision-making.

With civilian institutions secured, Munir then turned his attention inward, consolidating his authority at the apex of the military itself. In November 2025, the Pakistani government passed the 27th constitutional amendment, despite a boycott from Imran Khan’s party, the Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). The bill abolished the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which had previously coordinated the three services of the Pakistani military. In its place, Munir established a new post: Chief of Defence Forces, and unsurprisingly installed himself as its inaugural holder. This marked a significant break from the past, affording greater operational control over Pakistan’s air force and navy not just to the army, but to the army chief himself.

The amendment did more than just tilt the scales in favour of the army from within the military, it also further exposed the imbalance between civilian and military authority in Pakistan. It did so notably through the creation of yet another post, the Commander of the National Strategic Command, which would be directly responsible for the country’s nuclear arsenal. Crucially, the position is reserved for army officers and can only be appointed in consultation with the Chief of Defence Forces, preserving the army’s supremacy over such critical military decision-making and power. As if such sweeping changes were not enough, Munir also moved to shield himself personally, securing a range of personal protections including the right to retain his rank, uniform, and military responsibilities after retirement. Most importantly, the amendment also guaranteed the army chief’s immunity from prosecution for life, safeguarding Munir from any potential fallouts with the civilian government in the future. This development will also enable Munir to extend his tenure as army chief through into the 2030s, past the existing five year term limit that was already extended under Munir’s purview. These maneuvers leave no doubt about Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance, entrenching the army’s primacy within the constitution itself.

The implications of the army’s constitutional seizure of power in Pakistan are now playing out on the world stage. With Munir at the helm, virtually every facet of Pakistan’s foreign policy is being directed by the military. Amid Islamabad’s efforts to broker an end to the war in the Middle East, the government appointed 15 new ambassadors across Africa, Europe, and Asia. Crucially, more than half are retired generals, drawn from all three branches of the armed forces, with three retired servicemen given key postings in critical Middle Eastern states, including Jordan, Syria, and Qatar. Pakistan’s military is now so deeply embedded within its diplomatic apparatus that foreign governments are increasingly compelled to engage with the army, tacitly recognising it as Pakistan’s true centre of power.

The opinions expressed are those of the contributors, not necessarily of the RSAA.