Leadership and Governance are only half the electoral pie
Soumyadeep Chowdhury is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Adamas University, Kolkata and Allen David Simon is a postgraduate student at the University of Calcutta
Were Indian electoral politics governed by Yashwant Deshmukh’s set axiom that ‘half a decent leader who can ensure half a decent job tends to be re-elected,’ the Narendra Modi led BJP wouldn’t have failed to win an outright majority in the 2024 Lok Sabha Elections. The defeat of Naveen Patnaik in Odisha, Y S Jagan Mohan Reddy in Andhra Pradesh and more recently Arvind Kejriwal in Delhi state elections have discredited the assertion further. This necessitates a renewed analysis of anti-incumbency or incumbency disadvantage which seems to have characterised Indian elections for decades.
Offsetting Anti-Incumbency
Understood as the typical tendency to vote out the incumbent, anti-incumbency operates at three different levels i.e.: against the local representative, against the government and against the leader of the government. Overcoming general undercurrents of anti-incumbency therefore also requires a mix of strategies. For instance, the BJP in Madhya Pradesh tackled voter fatigue against long serving legislators and state government ministers by replacing many of them with new candidates. On the corollary, the Congress, despite enjoying the advantage of competent state leadership, in 2023 elections in Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh were unable to make it back to power. K Chandrasekhar Rao met with a similar fate in Telangana. Surprisingly, despite respective governments in all four states commanding over 50% approval rating, as reported by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), even a majority of the modestly satisfied electorate chose change over continuity in three of the four states which faced elections in December 2023.
Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel had the luxury of denying seats to unpopular legislators, given the Congress’ two-third majority in the Chhattisgarh Assembly. Ashok Gehlot, however, lacked similar margins in Rajasthan. As a result, 17 of Gehlot’s 25 ministers lost, routing the Congress in Rajasthan. Rao’s reluctance to replace tainted legislators due to his overconfidence in his personal popularity and governance record also cost him the election in Telangana, while charges of corruption and factionalism outweighed all other advantages for the Congress party in Chhattisgarh.
The BJP’s inability to win an outright majority in the 2024 general elections, despite Prime Minister Modi’s unmatched personal popularity and a largely successful second term that delivered on major promises, including the abrogation of Article 370, the Citizenship Amendment Act 2020, Ram Mandir consecration, social welfare and economic growth only reinforced that leadership and governance are not the only determinants in elections. The enviable governance track records of popular regional leaders such as Naveen Patnaik and Y S Jaganmohan Reddy couldn’t prevent their electoral losses either.
The BJP overcame expectations to retain Haryana and Maharashtra with greater majorities just months after its lackluster showing in the 2024 general elections. The BJP’s move to change the Chief Minister from Manohar Lal Khattar to Nayab Singh Saini before the state assembly elections in Haryana, combined with a strategic choice of local candidates, better synchronicity between the party organisation with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and a campaign engaging Union Ministers and BJP Chief Ministers from other states affirmed the need for organisational strength and micromanagement to win polls in both states. This explains why despite having stalwart leaders like Bhupinder Singh Hooda and Kumari Selja in Haryana and Prithviraj Chavan, Uddhav Thackeray and Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra on their side as well as anti-incumbency against the BJP looming large, the opposition failed to cut much ice with the electorate. The defeat of Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party in the 2025 Delhi Assembly elections despite Kejriwal’s leadership and governance credentials act as further proof against Deshmukh’s axiom, pointing to the emergence of newer trends.
Emerging trends and its electoral implications
First, there seems to be an increasing difference in the success rate of different political parties in neutralising anti-incumbency. Unlike earlier when anti-incumbency would affect the incumbent no matter their partisan affiliation, a stark diversity dividend across parties seems to be exhibited in the present day. While the BJP has gradually made long term pro-incumbencies a regular feature in Gujarat, and now in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and the North-East, the Congress hasn’t been able to retain any state for a second term since 2014. In Punjab, Puducherry, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, the party was voted out after a single term in government.
Second, while leadership and governance remain important electoral determinants, they tend to gradually yield diminishing returns. The BJP’s strategic shift from an overreliance on the cult of Modi to fighting state polls under the collective leadership of its local leaders is an example. Moreover, with every political party promising similar things, particularly those targeting the woman voter such as Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal, Majhi Ladki Behen in Maharashtra, Ladli Behena Yojana in Madhya Pradesh and Maiya Samman Yojana in Jharkhand, welfare schemes seem to be reaching saturation. With all political parties across the spectrum adopting welfare schemes and related promises, this is likely to result in a zero-sum game nullifying any competitive edge they once provided. This has perhaps forced a recalibration of the BJP’s strategy away from brash majoritarianism. Opposition parties like the Congress and the AAP have gone on to embrace soft Hindutva to make a dent in BJP strongholds. With no single factor deciding elections, each factor therefore works best not in isolation but only when conjoined with others.
Third, issues of gross corruption, internal factionalism and nepotism, left unaddressed, dent public perception offsetting credible leadership and even records of good governance. Kejriwal, Rao and Baghel clearly lost in the perception battle.
Road Ahead
The BJP’s presidential style of electioneering failed in 2024 despite Modi’s popularity and governance credentials. The opposition’s ability to localise polls, capitalise on the BJP’s internal weaknesses and put up a more coordinated front than ever before resulted in a stronger showing. Yet, a few months down the line the BJP beat the opposition at its own game by pulling off surprise victories in Haryana, Maharashtra and Delhi Assembly Elections.
The poor results of the Congress in these polls have hurt its leading role in the INDI Alliance emboldening regional parties to bargain for greater stakes, further jeopardising opposition unity at a time when its already arduous to overcome the lasting structural advantages that the BJP has built for itself nationally. The recalibration of the BJP’s strategy in terms of more prudent candidate choice, projection of collective leadership to avoid excessive dependence on the Prime Minister and overcoming internal factionalism, as well as ensuring greater cooperation between the party organisation and the RSS, seem to have emerged as a responsive approach that may become a main stay in neutralising anti-incumbency. The ruling and opposition parties thus need to reckon that new age electoral grammar requires the rephrasing of Deshmukh’s axiom and therefore a reorientation of their election strategies. In an epoch where no single factor determines elections, ‘half a decent leader who gets half the job done thus constitutes only half the electoral pie,’ with organisational strength, robust micromanagement and an emotive campaign, complemented by grassroots connectivity, becoming essential components of successful electioneering.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributors, not necessarily of the RSAA.
