Is the Resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Symptomatic of a Collapsing State?

Marcus Andreopoulos is a Senior Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, and a Subject Matter Expert with the Global Threats Advisory Group at NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme
Throughout April in Pakistan, shortly before tensions with India escalated into a full-blown conflict, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) momentarily reclaimed the spotlight. For a brief period, attention was diverted away from the likes of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) who have otherwise dominated the country’s security landscape in recent months. The TLP, notorious for coordinating lynch mobs against those alleged to have committed crimes of blasphemy – often based on dubious, if any, evidence – has now set its sights on American fast-food restaurants throughout Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the group also mobilised a mob against the country’s Ahmadiyya community, carrying out an extrajudicial killing of a man alleged to have breached Pakistan’s anti-Ahmadi laws. Although adopting vastly different tactics and motives to the TTP or the BLA, the TLP’s resurgence is yet another symptom of a moribund state, one that is now reeling from a military confrontation with India, in addition to myriad domestic security challenges that seem increasingly insurmountable.
The TLP emerged in 2015 as a right-wing Islamist group intent on upholding Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, often going further and killing those accused. The group’s roots predate its official formation, however, with inspiration taken from the assassination of the then governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, in January 2011. Taseer was considered to have been blasphemous, having spoken out to defend a Christian Pakistani, Asia Bibi, who had been convicted of insulting the Prophet Muhammad in 2010. In response, Taseer was assassinated by his bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, who claimed it was his ‘religious duty’ to kill anyone who challenged Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Qadri was arrested and subsequently sentenced to death in October 2011, a decision that mobilised various Barelvi groups inside Pakistan – a sect characterised by its strict reverence for the Prophet Muhammad and his relationship with God.
It was from this outburst of Barelvi agitation, that Khadim Hussain Rizvi founded the TLP. The Barelvis are no small minority in Pakistan, making up over 50% of the Muslims in the country. Despite this, during his Islamisation policies of the 1980s, Pakistan’s former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, prioritised the more extreme and militant Deobandi school, affording him more power both domestically and internationally in the context of the Cold War in Asia at the time. This had knock on effects which led Barelvis in Pakistan to feel increasingly marginalised and can offer some explanation as to why the TLP have been so successful in amassing thousands of supporters in recent years. It was under Zia’s leadership that the blasphemy law, ultimately the sole raison d’être of the TLP, gained prominence.
In the years that followed its founding, the TLP has mobilised lynch mobs to enact what it perceives as ‘justice’ against anyone accused of blasphemy. In 2017, TLP coordinated mobs dragged a 23 year old student from his dorm room before stripping, beating, and shooting him. A year later, it was a student who, inspired by the TLP, shot and killed his principal for reprimanding him for attending a rally in support of blasphemy laws. In 2019, another student was provoked by a TLP preacher to kill a senior English lecturer in Bahawalpur, who had allegedly ‘insulted’ Islam. More recently, the TLP staged a sit-in blocking the Islamabad Expressway until the Pakistani government agreed to send more consignments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. This was a tried and tested tactic of the group, that has previously been used to shut down the route from Lahore to Islamabad.
Through its ability to mobilise hundreds, if not thousands, of people, often inciting them to violence, the TLP wields significant power. This is not something that has gone unnoticed by governments in Islamabad over the years. In April 2021, recognising the challenge to his own brand of populist politics, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan spoke out on the issue of blasphemy, calling on Western governments to criminalise insulting the Prophet Muhammad, likening the issue to Holocaust denial. This attempt at appeasement did little to wrestle support away from the TLP, or moderate the group’s behaviour and, a month later, Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) party banned the outfit altogether. This was, however, short lived and by November the ban was lifted. By the new year, the PTI was in discussions with the TLP over an alliance ahead of the next election – an election, of course, that Khan would not be able to contest.
Khan’s inability to deal effectively with the threat posed by the TLP has led to the situation Pakistan now finds itself in. Throughout April, at least twenty separate incidences of mob violence directed towards KFC restaurants throughout the country were reported, leading to the arrest of nearly 200 people. In one case, on the outskirts of Lahore, a KFC employee was shot and killed. The source of anger for those involved appears to be the ongoing war in Gaza, however, fury at KFC, and in one case Domino’s Pizza, is rooted more in anti-American sentiment than any particular grievance, or perceived involvement of the brands in the conflict in the Middle East. Although the protests were not officially organised by the TLP, according to one senior police official from Lahore, they follow the same playbook as previous violent mass demonstrations. They also align with the TLP’s calls for protests against both the United States and Israel.
This course of action only ends up impacting ordinary Pakistanis. Far from dealing a blow to the US or Israel, it’s the Pakistanis who own the franchising rights or work in these restaurants who are in the firing line. Pakistan is already struggling to inspire investor confidence for large scale, state-backed infrastructure projects, particularly from China, owing to persistent militant attacks. This development now threatens to derail the country’s hospitality sector, as foreign franchises are now confronted with the decision to pull all involvement from the country, dealing a further blow to Pakistan’s ailing economy, or to stay put and risk further violence and bad publicity. The only certainty is that these companies cannot rely on the Pakistani state to implement effective security measures to prevent future outbursts on a similar scale, despite security being ramped up outside KFC restaurants across the country.
As for the TLP, the time to effectively deal with the group has seemingly passed, and it is unlikely that any government or military action now will yield positive results. Should Islamabad attempt to ban the group once again, then it could face even more violence in response. The TLP have already demonstrated their disdain for the state, with the group’s deputy chief openly calling for the beheading of the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Qazi Faez Esa, in July last year. Conversely, further appeasement will only embolden the TLP, spelling disaster for the country and especially minority groups such as the Ahmadis, who continue to face the unforgiving wrath of the TLP.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.