Azerbaijani Geopolitics and Pax-Eurasiana
Dr Ferit Murat Ozkaleli is Associate Professor of International Affairs at ADA University in Azerbaijan
A soft spotlight illuminates the stage as music fills Baku’s Old Opera House. It is Uzeyir Hajibeyov’s Leyli and Mecnun, a musical adaptation of a 16th-century tragic love poem by folk artist Fuzuli. When the music meets with the singer’s voice, the audience is struck by the integration of local elements of Azerbaijan’s original mugham and Western classical music. Widely recognized as the pioneering work in the Islamic world’s operatic repertoire, this opera, first staged in 1908, represents the complexities of Azerbaijani culture. Outside the Opera House, faces are brushed by the stormy breeze which gives Baku, ‘the City of Winds’, its namesake. It carries the scent of oil which the entire nation breathes with. The unique smell arrives from the former ‘Black City’ on the Caspian shore, only a few blocks away. This is where founding oil entrepreneurs, including Haji Zeynalabdin Tagiyev and the Nobel brothers, made their fortunes a century and a half ago.
This sets the scene and serves as an effective analogy for the key elements of Azerbaijani geopolitics: it is a Eurasian country located at the political, economic, and cultural crossroads that blend Western nation-state with oriental khanate feudalism, secularism with long traditions of Islam, and a robust oil industry. The ‘land of fire’ has long been an object of the expansionist policies of Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, modernists, and traditionalists, each with adherents and strong opposition within the country. Azerbaijan, a former Soviet Republic that regained its independence in 1991, is now seeking its proper place in global politics, trying to adapt to the geopolitical turbulence of power transition in an increasingly polarising world that has turned Eurasia into a battlefield.
The beginning was hard for independent Azerbaijan. Conflict erupted in the Karabakh region during the dying days of the Soviet Union and ended with a defeat in 1994, causing nearly thirty percent of Azerbaijan’s territory to be captured by Armenia and leaving around a million people internally displaced. As the unipolar moment lost its grip nearly three decades later, on a par with Charles Tilly’s famous assertion that ‘states make wars, and wars make states,’ Azerbaijan sealed its statehood with a decisive victory over Karabakh in 2020. The operation was a showcase for 21st century hybrid warfare, changing the balance of power on the battlefield, especially through the deployment of drone technology. The complete reintegration of Karabakh within three years further boosted Azerbaijan’s self-confidence. Yet, knowing that winning peace is as hard as winning a war, Baku is cautiously seeking ways to maintain a delicate balance among superpowers that will ensure autonomy whilst also increasing the country’s presence on the world stage.
Interest from powerful nations is not new to Azerbaijan. The temptation of oil has often drawn war to Baku. On 5 April 1942, Hitler signed Führer Directive No. 41 with the aim of capturing the oil fields of the South Caucasus. However, Baku could not be captured, and the German’s other flank was annihilated at Stalingrad, a crucial oil transportation hub on the River Don used to support the Soviet war effort. Remarkably, eighty years later, in July 2022, a Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy was signed by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President Aliyev in Baku to enhance energy security by reducing Europe’s dependence on Russia.
The world’s geopolitical scene is in dramatic transformation, shifting the power axis to Asia. In this ‘New Great Game,’ the Caucasus has become what Afghanistan used to be. This gives tremendous geopolitical leverage to Azerbaijan while putting the country under scrutiny. While Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon resources play an increasingly important role in Europe’s energy security, Baku’s multi-vector foreign policy maintains balance, paying attention to the country’s geopolitical position in the East as well as the West. Two developments on this front are worth mentioning. First, after two decades of negotiations, on 12 August 2018, the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in the Kazakh city of Aktau. This treaty practically eliminated all international waters in the Caspian Sea, dividing it among the littoral states and thus creating a sui generis status (i.e., neither lake nor sea). The treaty also fosters trade through the Caspian Sea routes, potentially turning Azerbaijan into an oil transportation hub. The expansion of the International Seaport of Baku, which plays an increasingly vital role in transporting natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to European markets, could contribute to the energy security of the continent.
Azerbaijan has further geopolitical reach as a transportation hub due to the ongoing restoration of the Silk Road. China’s ‘One-Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative constitutes Azerbaijan’s other bid for enhancing its geopolitical importance in the East. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), otherwise known as ‘the Middle Corridor,’ is turning Azerbaijan into a pivot state, as it links China’s ambitious transport network to Europe via Central Asia. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway has been operational since 2017 and provides a viable alternative. When the Caspian Sea route becomes fully functional, Chinese cargo can reach Europe, bypassing the ‘Afghanistan gap’ if necessary. Port Baku is already undergoing massive reconstruction with the aim of nearly doubling its capacity in order to meet the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities ahead. The route could be significantly shortened if the Zangezur Corridor that connects Azerbaijan proper to its exclave, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, were to be opened. Article 9 of the 2020 Russian-brokered agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which ended the Second Karabakh War, calls for unblocked transport connections in ‘both directions.’ Although Armenia is resistant to implementing this agreement, Russian pressure could make it possible soon. With the aim of bypassing a pro-European Georgia, Russians may keep an alternative and shorter route from Armenia, over whom they can exert a stronger influence. The East-West corridor is to be overseen by Russian border guards, giving Moscow gatekeeper status for the new Silk Road.
Second, Baku seeks power-balancing. The Shusha Declaration signed between Turkiye and Azerbaijan on 15 June 2021 formalised President Heydar Aliyev’s dictum, ‘one nation, two states.’ It strengthened the already powerful economic, cultural, social, and political ties between the two countries. The treaty also created a collective security system in which an attack on one would be responded to by both. Combined with Azerbaijan’s pivotal role in the foundation of the Organization of Turkic States and its recent chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Shusha Declaration attests to increasing diplomatic activism that contributes to the country’s increasing visibility in global politics and its delicate balance of power policies.
Of course, not all is rosy for Azerbaijan. For two centuries, millions of ethnic Azerbaijanis have lived under Iranian rule since the Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828 that split Azerbaijani territory between Russia and Iran. There has been increasing tension between Baku and Tehran after Azerbaijan’s victory over Iran-backed Armenians in Karabakh, followed by a degree of reproachment. At the same time, Russia and China, two strategic allies of Iran, admitted Tehran to BRICS, where they can broker a deal as part of a larger Eurasian alliance, as was done with the Caspian Sea Treaty.
Historically, Azerbaijan has always been under heavy Russian influence, and thus, may not be far from becoming fully integrated into the evolving pax-Eurasiana. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that attempts have been made to distinguish Azerbaijan’s national identity from that of its northern neighbour. In the past, both Arabic and Cyrillic scripts were used in Azerbaijan, yet Baku ultimately decided to express itself with the adaptation of the Latin Alphabet. This was a pioneering act among former Soviet Republics, signalling Baku’s intended political trajectory. Today, the ‘Black City’ has turned into the ‘White City’ with old oil refineries being replaced by affluent neighbourhoods, while ‘Port Baku,’ an adjacent neighbourhood, has become the home for many of Baku’s large expatriate population, mostly working in the oil industry and education sector. How much Baku’s trajectory can be sustained will be determined partially by Azerbaijan itself but also partially by how its Eurasian character develops and is interpreted by the West.
Azerbaijan still wishes to maintain good relations with the West. Nevertheless, Baku perceives a sense of favouritism toward Armenian, particularly among EU member-states. This was most recently seen in the Council of Europe meetings of January 2024, which ended with Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the Parliamentary Assembly amidst European threats to suspend membership. The West, of course, is not singular, and ever since Brexit, Britain, the largest Western investor in efforts to bring Azerbaijani oil to global markets, has no longer needed to harmonize its foreign policy with the EU. While Britain can continue to play a key role in Azerbaijan’s relations with the West, the European push and the Sino-Russian pull seem to set the main parameters for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in a polarising world. A viable alternative would be embracing Baku as a Eurasian bridge that connects the two.
The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not of the RSAA.
